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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper examines why commercial banks in Guyana demand non-remunerated excess 
reserves, a phenomenon that became even more widespread after financial liberalisation.  
Despite the removal of capital controls, banks do not invest all excess reserves in a safe 
foreign asset because the central bank maintains an unofficial foreign currency constraint 
by accumulating international reserves.  The findings suggest that commercial banks do 
not demand excess reserves for precautionary purpose – which is the conclusion of 
several other studies – but rather because of the maintained constraint.  The estimated 
sterilisation coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis of an enforced constraint.  The 
results, moreover, suggest an alternative way of looking at the monetary transmission 
mechanism in developing countries.  The central bank maintains price and exchange rate 
stability through the accumulation of foreign reserves.        
 
Key Words: Excess bank liquidity, monetary transmission mechanism, ARDL model, 
Guyana  
 
JEL Classifications: O11, E58, N16 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper posits the notion that banks in Guyana, operating within a supposed 
liberalised environment, are unable to invest all non-remunerated excess reserves in a 
safe interest-earning foreign asset because the central bank maintains an unannounced 
foreign currency constraint
1
.  The framework, however, is general enough to be 
                                                 
1
 The issue of global excess liquidity has occupied several researchers in recent times.  See for instance 
D’Arista (2006 and 2005).  Also, in a fairly recent issue of The Economist (August 13, 2005), the magazine 
sought to explain the decline in long-term bond yields, in the presence of a series of successive short-term 
 2 
applicable to other small open developing countries that have liberalised their financial 
system, interest rate determination, and capital flows.  Excess reserves, which are 
unremunerated, are defined as total commercial bank reserves minus required reserves.  
The required reserve ratio is set by the Bank of Guyana, Guyana’s central bank.  Hence, 
there are obvious empirical and theoretical puzzles as to why profit-maximising private 
commercial banks demand this asset when they can make loans, invest in government 
securities, or purchase foreign assets.  The paper does not seek to explain why banks have 
refused to make private loans or buy domestic government securities.  That is another 
matter which is explained theoretically and empirically in Khemraj (2006).  Instead, this 
is an empirical paper which furnishes an answer to the question of why the Guyanese 
commercial banks seemingly refuse to invest all excess reserves in a safe interest-earning 
foreign asset, even though inflation, coupled with exchange rate depreciation, is likely to 
make Guyanese banks susceptible to loss.   
The existing literature on the demand for excess bank reserves in developing 
countries is very sparse.  The few papers that have examined the issue in developing 
countries have relied on the classic reserve management model as outlined by 
Baltensperger (1980; 1973), Frost (1971), and Morrison (1966).  As outlined in those 
papers, the model is more applicable to the advanced economies, or more specifically to 
the United States
2
.  More recently Agenor, Aizenman, and Hoffmaister (2004) extended 
                                                                                                                                                 
rate increases by the Federal Reserve, by proffering two hypotheses – a global savings glut and a situation 
of global excess liquidity.  The latter was seen as being more consistent with the existing situation of low 
long-term bond yields and high output growth rates.  However, this paper seeks to address the issue within 
a developing country context and in so doing adds to a scarce literature on the phenomenon in the 
developing world.  
      
2
 A key prediction of the model is the notion that banks demand excess reserves for precautionary purposes.  
The paper finds no evidence that this is the case. 
 
 3 
this model in order to derive a testable empirical demand function for excess liquidity in 
Thailand.  Their primary objective was to decipher whether the curtailment of bank credit 
in Thailand after the Asian financial crisis was consistent with a credit crunch.  
Saxegaard (2006) extended the empirical model of Agenor, Aizenman, and Hoffmaister 
(2004) to include a vector of variables that accounts for “involuntary” excess reserves in 
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Nigeria and 
Uganda
3
.  In another paper, Fielding and Shorthand (2005) estimated an autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model of excess liquidity for Egypt.  Political violence was found 
to be an important determinant of excess liquidity in Egypt.  Caprio and Honohan (1993) 
proposed two reasons why banks might demand excess liquidity.  Their explanation, 
however, went beyond the classic reserve management model.  They proposed the credit 
rationing hypothesis and money overhang hypothesis
4
. 
None of the papers, however, has addressed the question as to why commercial 
banks seemingly refuse to invest excess reserves into a safe interest-earning foreign asset, 
especially since exchange control facilities have been dismantled (and flexible exchange 
rates adopted) in several of those countries.  In the case of Guyana a flexible exchange 
rate was adopted in 1991, while exchange control has been jettisoned since 1995
5
.   
                                                 
3
 According to Saxegaard (2006) several variables that account for involuntary reserve accumulation 
include inflows of foreign aid, newfound oil revenue, weak demand for bank loans (resulting from high 
loan rates), and government deposits in commercial banks. 
 
4
Caprio and Honohan (1993) noted that the money overhang hypothesis is more applicable to former 
planned economies in which there was a period of goods rationing in the commodity market.  Credit 
rationing, on the other hand, is likely to occur in both advanced and developing countries.     
  
5
 In 1991 the Guyanese authorities merged the parallel foreign currency market with the official market.   
Since then there has been no misalignment between the official rate and the “street” rate.  The exchange 
rate is determined freely by market traders in foreign currencies – mainly commercial banks and other 
authorised non-bank traders who must obtain a license from the central bank.  The Guyanese central bank 
(the Bank of Guyana) defends the rate by accumulating international reserves.  On several occasions the 
central bank sells from its reserves.  However, most times it must buy United States dollars and other 
 4 
This paper proposes the hypothesis of a foreign currency constraint that is 
maintained by the central bank.  The constraint results from the fact that the central bank 
is operating within the ambits of an indirect monetary policy
6
 regime, which was adopted 
after 1988 within the context of radical financial and economic reforms such as bank 
privatisations, interest rate and credit deregulation, market-based monetary policy, and 
the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime.  The main finding of this paper is that the 
foreign currency constraint provides the best explanatory variable for excess bank 
liquidity.  The research finds no evidence that Guyanese banks demand excess reserves 
for precautionary purposes.  Moreover, the factors such as foreign aid, remittances, and 
other capital inflows that Saxegaard (2006) tested for in the Sub-Saharan African context 
are irrelevant in the Guyanese situation since rational profit-maximizing private banks, 
operating in an environment of capital account liberalisation, would seek to free 
themselves of the non-remunerative asset by accumulating interest-earning foreign assets.     
To determine whether the constraint is indeed maintained by the central bank, the 
paper also estimates the sterilisation coefficient.  A sterilisation coefficient that is closer 
to -1 is indicative of a maintained constraint, while a coefficient closer to zero implies the 
central bank is more interested in maintaining slack liquidity conditions.  Given these 
findings, the paper proposes another way of looking at the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Guyana with potential applications in similar small open economies.   
                                                                                                                                                 
currencies from the local market since the domestic currency cannot be traded in the main global 
international financial centres.    
 
6
 Alexander et al (1995, p. 2) define direct versus indirect monetary policy instruments.  Direct instruments 
set or limit prices (interest rates) or quantity (credit).  The quantity-based direct instruments often place 
restrictions on commercial banks’ balance sheet.  Indirect instruments, in contrast, operate through the 
market by influencing the demand and supply conditions of commercial bank reserves.  Embedded within 
the IMF’s financial programming framework is the view that the reserve position of the banking system 
determines bank credit and broad money supply.   
 
 5 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section II examines important background 
information relating to excess liquidity and the foreign currency constraint.  Section III 
tests for the foreign currency constraint and estimates the sterilisation coefficient.  
Section IV explains the implications of the empirical findings for the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  Section V concludes.  
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
Figure 1 presents the extent of non-remunerative excess bank reserves over a 
period long enough to compare pre- and post-financial liberalisation.  The diagram shows 
the ratio of actual reserves (AR) to required reserves (RR) over the period 1980 to 2006.  
A ratio of one signals zero excess reserves, less than one signals a deficit, while a ratio 
greater than one indicates excess reserves.  Although the general economic reforms 
commenced in late 1988, the main financial reforms started in 1991.  Figure 1 indicates 
that the banking system became a lot more liquid after the reforms which include bank 
privatisation, interest rate and credit liberalisation, and the entry of foreign banks
7
.  
Although not the focus of this paper, it should be noted that over the same period the 
private commercial banks have diminished loans to the private sector.   They have, 
however, in addition to demanding more excess liquidity, increased their purchase of 
foreign financial assets, which comprise of mainly deposits in foreign counterpart banks.     
(FIG. 1 HERE) 
The foreign exchange market in Guyana is made up of bank and non-bank traders 
who buy and sell mainly US dollars.  The stock of US dollars traded at any time comes 
mainly from export proceeds, foreign aid, remittances, and foreign loans.  The US dollar 
                                                 
7
 Non-remunerative excess bank reserves have also been on the rise in Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Belize, The Bahamas, and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (see Khemraj, 2006). 
    
 6 
is used for importing, servicing the external debt, accumulating international reserves (by 
the central bank), and investing in foreign assets (by commercial banks)
8
.  At any given 
point in time the foreign currency constraint (FCC) is measured by the amount of US 
dollars that is purchased minus the amount that is sold.  A surplus would mean the 
amount purchased by banks is greater than the amount sold.  Hence, it is possible to study 
the extent to which a surplus or deficit of US dollars (the FCC) in the domestic foreign 
exchange market can influence the level of non-remunerative excess bank reserves, the 
change in foreign assets, and the flow of loans to the private sector.     
 When faced with a foreign currency constraint, commercial banks are unable to 
purchase all desired amounts of foreign assets. In other words, if the foreign exchange 
market is in a deficit, the change in foreign assets will decline, while at the same time the 
level of excess bank reserves will increase.  It is therefore expected that the change in 
foreign assets will be positively related to a surplus in the foreign exchange market, while 
excess reserves will be negatively correlated with such a surplus.  It is also interesting to 
see the extent to which the FCC can influence the flow of bank loans to the private sector.  
However, if there is no such relationship it implies banks prefer to acquire excess 
reserves rather than make loans to the private sector when the foreign exchange market is 
in a deficit.   
The scatter plots (Figures 2, 3 and 4) are based on monthly data from Jan 1996 to 
Dec 2006.  Figure 2 shows a positive correlation between the change in the level of 
commercial bank foreign assets and the surplus or deficit of US dollars in the foreign 
                                                 
8
Mainly the US currency is traded in the Guyanese foreign currency market.  As at the end of 2005 US$674 
million was purchased, while ₤23.8 million was bought by traders.   At the same time US$651.9 million 
was sold compared with ₤21.7 million.   Small amounts of the Canadian dollar and the Euro were bought 
and sold during that period.     
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exchange market (the FCC).  The information contained in Figure 2 is largely consistent 
with the existence of a foreign currency constraint.  Figure 3 shows the correlation, which 
is negative, between the FCC and the ratio of total bank reserves divided by required 
bank reserves.  The ratio of total reserves to required reserves will be one if the level of 
excess reserves is zero.  The fitted line in Figure 3 shows that the ratio approaches one as 
the quantity of US dollars in circulation rises.  On the other hand, banks are willing to 
amass excess reserves when there is a shortage of US dollars. 
(FIG. 2 HERE) 
(FIG. 3 HERE) 
   Figure 3 illustrates the extent to which the FCC influences the loan market.  If a 
deficit in the foreign exchange market induces the banks to make loans it implies bank 
portfolios are responsive to liquidity shocks.  If liquidity shocks do not elicit much of a 
change in the loan market, then bank portfolios are static.  This implies bank lending is a 
function of another mechanism and not the liquidity position of the system.  Figure 4 
illustrates an almost flat fitted line that intersects the vertical axis just above zero.  The 
implication being a surplus or deficit of US dollars in the foreign exchange market is not 
likely to elicit a substantial change in the supply of bank loans to private agents.  This 
outcome is consistent with the hypothesis of Khemraj (2006, 2007) that LDC banks 
demand a minimum mark-up loan rate (owing to oligopoly power) in the loan market.  
Therefore, liquidity shocks along the minimum rate do not elicit a response in bank 
lending.   
(FIG. 4 HERE) 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
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   This section tests formally for the determinants of excess reserves by estimating 
an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL).  In addition to testing for the validity of 
the foreign currency constraint, the paper also seeks to establish whether commercial 
banks demand non-remunerative excess reserves for precautionary purposes.  Several 
other authors – for instance: Agenor, Aizenman, and Hoffmaister (2004), Saxegaard 
(2006), and Fielding and Shorthand (2005) – have also tested for precautionary excess 
reserves.  Typically several measures of volatility are utilized to proxy uncertainty and 
therefore precautionary demand. 
 This paper adopts a similar measure of volatility as Agenor, Aizenman, and 
Hoffmaister (2004), and Saxegaard (2006).  In particular, the paper looks at the volatility 
of currency withdrawals and bank credit to the private sector.  The currency withdrawal 
variable is approximated by the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits.  A rise in 
volatility of these two variables should induce banks to demand excess reserves.  Hence, 
a positive relationship is expected.  Equation 1 identifies the measure of volatility that is 
adopted in this paper.  According to the formula, the volatility is the sample standard 
deviation of the variable X, where X represents (i) the ratio of demand deposits to total 
deposits and (ii) the ratio of private sector credit to total deposits.  In this case n is the 
averaging period, which is taken to be three months.               
1/2
2
1
(1/ ) ( )
n
t t ii
volX n X X
  
       (1) 
According to the classic reserve management model, the penalty for a reserve 
deficit position can be an important factor forcing banks to hold liquidity for 
precautionary purposes.  The penalty rate is represented by the central bank’s discount 
rate.  A high discount rate forces banks to avoid the penalty by holding sufficient excess 
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reserves.  Therefore, a positive relationship between the discount rate and excess reserves 
is expected.  Another key determinant of excess reserves ought to be the required reserve 
ratio.  An increase (decrease) in the ratio ought to decrease (increase) excess reserves.  
However, including this variable as an independent variable is problematic given that it 
has only changed three times over the period of analysis.  Hence, the total sum of squares 
of this variable would be very low.  It was therefore omitted as an independent variable.     
The foreign currency constraint – which is measured as the total purchases of US 
dollars minus the total sales of US dollars by commercial banks – is postulated to have a 
negative effect on excess reserves.  If there is a surplus of US dollars in the domestic 
foreign exchange market, banks would decrease excess reserves and purchasing foreign 
assets.  On the other hand, a deficit (or shortage) of US dollars in the domestic foreign 
exchange market forces banks to accumulate excess reserves.  As discussed in previous 
section, banks do not increase lending to the private sector when faced with a shortage of 
foreign exchange.   
Given the above discussion, the general ARDL model is represented by equation 
2.  The relevant variables are ter  which denotes the ratio of total reserves to required 
reserves; fcc which denotes the foreign exchange market surplus or deficit; exr which 
represents the change in the Guyana dollar-US dollar exchange rate
9
 (where 0exr   
signals a depreciation and 0exr  an appreciation of the Guyana dollar vis-à-vis the US 
dollar); disr  which symbolise the discount rate; and volX which represents the volatility 
                                                 
9
 An earlier version of this paper included the volatility of the exchange rate.  However, it was found to be 
statistically insignificant. 
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measure.  The term 
t  denotes the serially uncorrelated, homoskedastic, and normally 
distributed error term.  
0 0 0 0 0 1
n p q s m
t i t i j t j k t k t l t l ti j k l
er fcc exr volX disr er                          
 
(2) 
            Given the explanation above, the coefficient j is expected to be negative; 
indicating a depreciation of the Guyana dollar would encourage commercial banks to 
diminish non-remunerative excess reserves as there is a flight to foreign assets.  It is 
expected that increased uncertainty with respect to currency withdrawal and private 
sector credit would encourage banks to hold precautionary balances of excess reserves.  
Therefore k is expected to be negative.  Since the penalty rate (which the discount 
rate proxies) exerts a positive effect on excess reserves, we can expect  to be 
positive.    
The estimation is based on a sample of monthly data that ranges from January 
1996 to December 2006, a total of 132 observations
10
.  However, before estimating 
equation 1, it is important to examine the time series properties of each variable in the 
equation.  Therefore, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is applied to each 
univariate time series in order to establish the order of integration.  In other words, it is 
important to determine whether the variable is stationary in its level, in first or in second 
difference.  The results of the unit root tests, based on a unit root null hypothesis versus a 
stationary alternative, are reported in Appendix 1 (Table A).  The tests indicate that both 
                                                 
10
 The excess reserves and foreign exchange market purchases and sales data were obtained from the Bank 
of Guyana Statistical Bulletin, while all other series were obtained from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics.    
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(er) and (fcc) are stationary in their level.  Exr is non-stationary in its level, but becomes 
stationary after differencing once. 
According to equation 2, there are five independent variables (that include two 
volatility variables and one lagged dependent variable).  Since monthly data are used, the 
general regression ought to be estimated with at least twelve lags; however, trying to do 
so resulted in near perfect multicollinearity.  Therefore, in order to come up with the most 
suitable dynamic structure of the ARDL model, several separate bi-variate regressions 
with twelve lags of each independent variable (with er as the dependent variable) were 
estimated.  In each regression, t-tests and Wald (F-tests) were used to exclude the 
contemporaneous and lagged variables.  After testing down the following regression 
(equation 3) was suggested by the data.     
0 1 1 2 2 3 4
ˆ
t t t t t ter er er fcc exr                       (3) 
 Interestingly, neither of the volatility variables was found to be a significant 
determinant of excess reserves
11
.  Similarly, the discount rate was also insignificant in 
both contemporaneous and lagged effects.  These results tend to suggest that Guyanese 
commercial banks do not demand excess reserves for precautionary purposes.     
The estimation results for equation 3 are presented in Table 1.  Each coefficient 
has the expected sign and the fcc term is highly significant, thereby implying the foreign 
currency constraint is binding. exr is also very significant at the 1 percent level (as the  
p-values and/or t-statistics indicate).   (Er) is also explained by its one period lag ert-1.  
The equation performs very well on the diagnostic tests.  The Lagrange multiplier tests 
for serial correlation at one and twelve lags of the residual term do not reveal this 
                                                 
11
 Experimentation with GARCH (1, 1) models as a measure of volatility of the different series could not 
change this conclusion. 
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problem.  In light of the Jarque-Bera test, the null hypothesis of normality cannot be 
rejected.  White’s test could not reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, thus 
indicating that the residuals of the model have a constant variance.  The model was also 
tested for coefficient and variance stability using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ that were 
applied by Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005).  The tests which were applied to the 
residuals of the model were favourable (see Appendix 1; Figures A and B).   
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
The sterilisation coefficient  
The sterilisation coefficient can provide important insights into the monetary 
policy stance of the Bank of Guyana.  The coefficient takes values from 0 to -1.  A 
coefficient value closer to -1 signals the extent to which the central bank compensates the 
commercial banks for the foreign currency constraint it imposes on them when it buys the 
hard currency from the domestic market.  It should be noted that the Guyana dollar is not 
tradable in the international foreign exchange markets; hence, the central bank can only 
pay for foreign exchange by using the domestic currency at home in the local foreign 
exchange market.  Commercial banks could use the foreign currency to purchase foreign 
assets and earn a rate of return instead of holding non-remunerative excess reserves.  
Instead, the banks are compensated with domestic government Treasury bills.  Therefore, 
the size of the coefficient gives information on the central bank’s monetary policy 
objective.  A coefficient closer to -1 would signal a strong desire for stabilisation of the 
exchange rate and prices.  It should also be noted that a coefficient closer to -1 signals 
 13 
that the central bank has been successful in neutralizing the impact of foreign exchange 
market interventions on the money supply (or bank liquidity
12
).      
On the other hand, a coefficient that approaches 0 will indicate a desire for 
monetary expansion – and by extension economic expansion – since liquidity is injected 
into the system.  If the coefficient equals 0, then a change in the international reserve 
position of the central bank is completely reflected in the monetary base.  One can 
conclude that the stimulation of bank lending and economic growth is the paramount 
objective.                 
(FIG. 5 HERE)  
Figure 5 plots the change in net foreign assets (NFA) and the change in net 
domestic assets (NDA) of the Bank of Guyana.  The figure underscores a tendency for 
one to offset the other – a behaviour that is typical of Guyana’s monetary policy in which 
the central bank varies its net domestic assets (the main component being Guyana 
government Treasury bills) in order to offset variations in net foreign assets.  The latter is 
comprised of foreign currency reserves that the monetary authority must purchase from 
the domestic foreign exchange market by paying with the national medium of exchange.   
To prevent the unwanted build-up of the monetary base and excess bank reserves, the 
central bank sterilises the prior liquidity injections by selling Treasury bills from its asset 
portfolio. 
In order to estimate the sterilisation coefficient, the central bank reaction function 
given by equation 4 is estimated.  The sterilisation coefficient is denoted by 1 .  The 
central bank is also likely to vary its instrument (NDA) in anticipation of changes in 
                                                 
12
 An earlier version of this paper tested for whether a change in international reserves of the central bank 
influences the level of excess reserves.  It was found to be statistically insignificant.  The high sterilisation 
coefficient in this section would tend to corroborate this finding.   
 14 
inflation and the exchange rate
13
.  These variables are captured in the vector  .  We 
would expect a depreciation of the exchange rate to be followed by a tightening of 
monetary policy.  In other words, the central bank is likely to decrease NDA when the 
exchange rate depreciates ( 0exr  ) and increase NDA when the opposite occurs with 
the exchange rate.  The expected result is therefore a negative response coefficient with 
respect to the exchange rate.  A negative response coefficient vis-à-vis the inflation rate 
(or the rate of growth of the CPI) can also be expected.         
0 0 0 1
n m p
t i p t j k t k ti j kt i
NDA NFA NDA e                            (4) 
There is, however, an important methodological issue – which was raised by 
Magee (1976) – that emerges when one tries to estimate equation 4.  It is the problem of 
simultaneity that results from the likelihood that NFA  is an endogenous variable and is 
therefore correlated with the equation error term te .  In such a situation the use OLS 
estimator is not recommended since it is biased and inconsistent.  Therefore, most 
researchers have instead utilised two-stage least squares (TSLS).  Others who have used 
TSLS to estimate the sterilisation coefficient include Cumby and Obstfeld (1983), 
Brissimis, Gibson and Tsakalotos (2002), and Seo (2005).   
This paper, however, does not take it for granted that NFA is endogenous.  A 
test for endogeneity, as suggested by Wooldridge (2006, p. 532), is performed.  A 
reduced form regression is estimated by OLS.  The independent variables in the reduced 
                                                 
13
 The Bank of Guyana notes that the NDA is its instrument which it manipulates to achieve the objectives 
of stable prices and exchange rate stability.  To enable the day to day management of excess reserves the 
central bank utilises a reserve money programme, which is itself rooted in the financial programming 
framework.  See Tarp (1993) for detailed discussion of the financial programming framework.         
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form equation are: (i) ΔNFAt – 1, (ii) ΔNDA and ΔNDA
14
t – 1, (iii) ΔExr, (iv) ΔCPI and (v) 
the opportunity cost of holding foreign assets (estimated in its first difference).  It would 
have been useful to include a scalar variable such as import in the reduced from 
regression (Huang, 1995).  However, a long enough monthly import series is unavailable.  
The opportunity cost for holding foreign assets is the loss of developmental funds to the 
domestic economy (Huang, 1995).  Hence, this variable is measured as the difference 
between the domestic lending rate and the US three month Treasury bill rate.  The t-
statistic could not reject the null hypothesis of non-endogeneity of ΔNFA.  Therefore, 
given that the TSLS estimator would be less efficient relative to OLS when ΔNFA is 
exogenous, the paper proceeds with the OLS estimates.  It should be noted, however, that 
the TSLS coefficient estimates are identical to the OLS.  However, the TSLS standard 
errors are higher.  One would expect such an outcome since it was found that ΔNFA is 
exogenous.    
 The time series properties of the variables in equation 4 are reported in Appendix 
1 (Table A).  There it can be seen that both NDA and NFA are I (1) series.  Hence, the 
chance of spurious regression problems is diminished when the equation is estimated in 
first differences.  Table 2 reports the parsimonious estimation results for equation 4.  The 
estimate for the sterilisation coefficient overshoots the expected upper bound of -1.  As 
was done earlier, the final lag structure was arrived at by using the Wald test and 
individual t-tests to eliminate the higher order lags.    
The estimated value of -1.06 is statistically significant as the p-value indicates.  
The result nevertheless implies that the central bank has a strong preference for monetary 
                                                 
14
 Lags beyond the first period lag were insignificant.  Hence, only contemporaneous and one period lag for 
the respective independent variable was included in the reduced form equation.   
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contraction over monetary expansion (for the review period).  The monetary policy 
stance, therefore, focuses extensively on mopping up excess reserves through the sales of 
Treasury bills to commercial banks.  The policy is inherently deflationary (as banks are 
compensated with Treasury bills – hence there is reduced incentive for banks to augment 
credit to businesses), which possibly helps to explain why the Guyanese economy 
continues to stagnate in light of significant financial liberalisation and pro-market 
reforms over the period of analysis. 
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
Figure 6 presents the recursive least squares estimate of the sterilisation 
coefficient.  The recursive coefficient is computed using ever larger subsets of the sample 
data until all the sample data points are utilised.  The recursive estimate depicts the extent 
to which the coefficient changes over time.  Over the period of analysis, the coefficient 
tends to persistently overshoot the upper limit expected value of -1.  It however tends to 
stabilise after 2004 around the static estimate of -1.06.  The recursive estimates, 
therefore, also corroborate the finding that the central bank has a strong desire for 
monetary contraction, which is done by compensating the commercial banks for the 
induced foreign currency constraint.  The very high sterilisation coefficient, moreover, 
indicates that foreign exchange market interventions of the central bank are not reflected 
in the monetary base and therefore do not influence the persistent excess reserves in the 
banking system.  This policy, however, is not without its costs.  Calvo (1991), for 
instance, cautioned against the policy of persistent monetary sterilisation since it results 
in the accumulation of domestic debt.   
(FIG. 6 HERE)       
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      The diagnostic tests reported in Table 2 are favourable, except there was a 
problem of heteroskedasticity in the residual of the estimated model.  Therefore, in order 
to correct the standard errors to obtain unbiased estimates, the White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors were computed and are therefore reported.  Furthermore, the 
coefficient that captures the response of NDA to a change in the CPI was highly 
insignificant and it did not possess the expected sign.  The response coefficient to the 
change in the exchange rate is reported since it possesses the correct sign despite only 
being statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  As a stability check, CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ plots are reported in Appendix 1 (Figures C and D).  These suggest no 
inherent instability in the estimated reaction function.   
IV. ALTERNATIVE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM  
In light of the findings in the preceding sections, the following view of the 
monetary transmission mechanism (as outlined in Figure 7) is proposed.  This view is 
very different from that of the current literature.  Mishkin (1995) summarises the main 
channels through which monetary policy can affect prices and output.  Numerous 
empirical analyses have tried to validate which channel is most suited to a particular 
country.  For example, Iturriaga (2000) examines the transmission mechanism for twelve 
OECD countries.  Several studies have also tried to replicate the established mechanisms 
found in the advanced economies to periphery or underdeveloped economies.  It is not so 
clear, however, why these mechanisms are also applicable to underdeveloped economies.  
The reason being that the financial structure of these economies is dominated by 
commercial banks, many (or most) of which have been privatised (after the wave of 
financial liberalisation).  The commercial banking sector, moreover, is highly 
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concentrated and therefore the few dominant banks, which are the price setters, possess 
market power in both the loan market and the newly established markets for the 
government securities (such as Treasury bills).  In such a situation, therefore, the banks 
are not likely to set the loan rate and even the bid rate on Treasury bills (at primary 
auctions) endogenously of central bank monetary policy (or liquidity) shocks.  Rather, 
banks are more likely to set these rates exogenously by marking up the rates (see 
Khemraj, 2007).  
(FIG. 7 HERE)              
Given the empirical results, it seems as though the ultimate objective of the 
Guyanese central bank is price stability.  Growth and employment creation, on the other 
hand, do not seem to be high priority objectives.  Therefore, prices are stabilised by 
accumulating international reserves (which form the bulk of NFA of the central bank).  
The increase in NFA means a build-up of excess reserves that can stimulate bank loans 
and domestic demand (consumption + business investments) once borrowers are willing 
to pay the rate of interest stipulated by the desired minimum mark-up loan rate, which is 
derived in Khemraj (2006; 2007).  Also an exogenous increase of bank loans diminishes 
excess reserves as illustrated by the double-pointed arrow linking the loan market with 
excess reserves (or the interbank market).  However, when banks choose to accumulate 
excess reserves the loan market exert limited influence on domestic demand.    
However, the central bank has a more potent weapon against inflation when it 
accumulates NFA.  By buying foreign currency from the local market it enforces a 
foreign currency constraint in that market.  It prevents banks from investing all excess 
reserves in a safe foreign asset and it curtails the import of foreign goods and services.  
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As was argued earlier, commercial banks are forced to hold excess reserves when the 
constraint is binding.  The exchange rate, which passes through to inflation, is likely to be 
stabilised. 
As a result of the imposed foreign currency constraint, the central bank 
compensates the commercial banks by selling them the domestic government Treasury 
bills, which also serves as a tool to mop up excess reserves.  The easy availability of 
Treasury bills cause banks to hold large levels of excess liquid assets (mainly domestic 
government Treasury bills in excess of the liquid asset ratio).  In so doing, the banks are 
in no hurry to compete against each other for private business loans by bidding down the 
loan rate.  The private oligopoly banks, therefore, are in an even better position to enforce 
the minimum mark-up loan rate.  Hence, many private businesses are crowded out by the 
perennially high loan rates.  The central bank also maintains exchange rate and price 
stability by enforcing confidence (optimistic expectations) when it builds up foreign 
reserves.    
V. CONCLUSION 
The paper argued that commercial banks demand excess reserves because they 
cannot invest the entire holdings of non-remunerative assets in a safe foreign asset, in 
spite of the fact that there is no official legal barrier prohibiting such outflows.  The 
condition of a constraint is enforced by the central bank when it accumulates foreign 
exchange reserves.  The estimated sterilisation coefficient supports this premise.  The 
banks are in turn compensated by the central bank which sells them government 
securities.  Contrary to the findings of recent authors, the empirical results indicate that 
commercial banks do not demand excess reserves for precautionary purposes.   
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The build-up of excess reserves – caused by the enforced foreign currency 
constraint – does not lead to increased lending to the private sector.  Although not the 
focus of this paper, Khemraj (2006) has argued that commercial banks demand a 
minimum mark-up rate of interest in the loan market and even the government Treasury 
bill market.  For instance, when a borrower wishes to pay an interest rate below the 
desired minimum rate, the bank will accumulate excess reserves passively if the foreign 
currency constraint is simultaneously binding.  Such behaviour is also consistent with 
profit-maximisation.     
The findings of this paper provide an alternative viewpoint of the monetary 
transmission mechanism for Guyana, and possibly similar developing countries.  The 
central bank seems to focus extensively on price stability in a highly open developing 
economy.  The central bank can achieve its objective of price stability (through exchange 
rate stability) by amassing international reserves.  Furthermore, in such a situation the 
central bank loses control of the monetary base unless it can fully sterilise the effects of 
foreign exchange market interventions.   
High levels of international reserves tame expectations of future exchange rate 
depreciations and therefore engender expectations of stable prices.  Importantly, also, the 
build-up of international reserves creates a shortage or constraint in the foreign currency 
market.  Commercial banks are unable to invest all excess reserves in a foreign asset and 
at the same time importers have to curtail or postpone imports.  By curtailing the demand 
for foreign financial securities and foreign goods, the demand for the scarce foreign 
currency is diminished.   
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Figure 1: The ratio of total reserves divided by required reserves (annual data: 1980 – 
2006) 
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Figure 2: Change in commercial banks foreign assets (FA) and the FCC (1996: Jan – 
2006: Dec) 
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Figure 3: Excess reserves and the FCC (1996: Jan – 2006: Dec) 
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Figure 4: Change of loans to the private sector (LP) and the FCC (1996: Jan – 2006: Dec) 
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Figure 5: Bank of Guyana-change in net foreign (NFA) and domestic (NDA) assets 
(1996: Jan – 2006: Dec) 
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Figure 6: The time-varying recursive sterilisation coefficient 
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Figure 7: Alternative monetary transmission mechanism  
 
 
 
Table 1: Estimation results for equation 3 
 
Dependent Variable: Er
Sample: 1996M01 2006M12 (monthly data)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant 0.373 0.083 4.510 0.000
Er (t-1) 0.516 0.080 6.480 0.000
Er (t-2) 0.202 0.080 2.533 0.013
Fcc -0.010 0.003 -3.704 0.000
Δexr -0.019 0.007 -2.844 0.005
Adj R-square 0.560
Serial corr. LM(1) n*R
2
 = 0.003 P-value = 0.952
Serial corr. LM(6) n*R
2
 = 7.8 P-value = 0.249
Heteroskedasticity (White) n*R
2
 = 17.8 P-value = 0.213
Normality Jarque-Bera= 1.82 P-value = 0.402  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Estimation results for equation 4 
 
 
NDA 
NFA 
Loan 
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(expectations) 
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demand 
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Exchange 
rate 
Inflation 
Demand 
for foreign  
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Dependent Variable: Δ(NDA)
Sample: 1996M01 2006M12 (monthly data)
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant 418.56 184.83 2.26 0.025
Δ(NFA) -1.06 0.08 -13.10 0.000
Δ(NFA (t-1)) -0.20 0.10 -2.02 0.045
Δ(NDA(t-1)) -0.18 0.09 -2.08 0.039
Δ(Exr) -242.40 140.05 -1.73 0.086
Adj R-square 0.86
Serial corr. LM(1) n*R
2
 = 0.93 P-value = 0.333
Serial corr. LM(6) n*R
2
 = 10.9 P-value = 0.092
Normality Jarque-Bera= 0.39 P-value = 0.821  
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
Variable Lags Lags
er 1 -3.71 * 1 -4.01 **
fcc 1 -9.16 * 1 -9.11 *
exr 2 -1.57 2 -1.45
Δexr 1 -4.49 * 1 -4.67 *
cpi 1 -0.85 1 -2
Δcpi 1 -11.8 * 1 -11.9 *
NDA 1 -2.24 1 -2.25
ΔNDA 1 -12.2 * 1 -12.4 *
NFA 1 -2.47 1 -2.49
Δ(NFA) 1 -10.6 * 1 -11.1 *
The optimum number of lags were chosen by  Akaike information criterion 
Intercept 
alone
Trend &
 Intercept
* Significant at 1 percent
** Significant at 5 percent
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Figure A: Plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals (for equation 3) 
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Figure B: Plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (for equation 3) 
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Figure C: Plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals (for equation 4) 
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Figure D: Plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (for equation 4) 
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